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a b s t r a c t
Individuals with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) display poor emotional conﬂict adaptation, a cognitive control process requiring the adjustment of performance based on previous-trial conﬂict. It is unclear
whether GAD-related conﬂict adaptation difﬁculties are present during tasks without emotionally-salient
stimuli. We examined conﬂict adaptation using the N2 component of the event-related potential (ERP)
and behavioral responses on a Flanker task from 35 individuals with GAD and 35 controls. Groups did not
differ on conﬂict adaptation accuracy; individuals with GAD also displayed intact RT conﬂict adaptation.
In contrast, individuals with GAD showed decreased amplitude N2 principal component for conﬂict adaptation. Correlations showed increased anxiety and depressive symptoms were associated with longer RT
conﬂict adaptation effects and lower ERP amplitudes, but not when separated by group. We conclude
that individuals with GAD show reduced conﬂict-related component processes that may be inﬂuenced
by compensatory activity, even in the absence of emotionally-salient stimuli.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. 1 Introduction
There is an increasing focus on the role of cognitive and emotional control regulation processes on the mechanisms underlying
psychiatric disorders. Understanding the nature of these processes
may be useful in differentiating between disorders with similar pathophysiology and in understanding the mechanisms that
contribute to psychopathology. Speciﬁcally, in generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) studies suggest that poor ability to detect
emotional conﬂict and subsequently alter behavior may underlie
dysfunctional emotion regulation behaviors and may be tied to
altered attention and inhibitory control mechanisms (Etkin, Prater,
Hoeft, Menon, & Schatzberg, 2010). However, the preponderance of
research to date has focused on the inﬂuence of emotional conﬂict
on cognitive processing (i.e., when there are conﬂicting emotional
stimuli). Due to the absence of research on cognitive control functioning in anxiety without emotional stimuli, it is unclear whether
ﬁndings are due to generalized decrements in cognitive control or
whether dysregulation is speciﬁc to the processing of emotional
stimuli (Ernst, 2010). Thus, exploring conﬂict processing using nonemotional stimuli may help to elucidate the nature of deﬁcits in
cognitive processing in individuals with GAD.
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A potential way to understand putative deﬁcits in conﬂict
processing in anxiety is through studies of emotional and cognitive
conﬂict adaptation (also referred to as sequential-trial or Gratton effects; Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). Conﬂict adaptation
requires both the accurate detection of conﬂict and the subsequent
signaling for increased cognitive resources to adjust performance
(Botvinick, Carter, Braver, Barch, & Cohen, 2001; Gratton et al.,
1992). Conﬂict adaptation is typically seen during conﬂict-laden
tasks, such as the Stroop or ﬂanker, where conﬂict is created by similar (i.e., congruent) or differing (i.e., incongruent) target-stimulus
properties and task-irrelevant information. Tasks that utilize cognitive or emotional target stimuli facilitate the examination of either
cognitive or emotional processes (respectively) on conﬂict detection and resolution. Tasks that utilize task-irrelevant emotional
distractors facilitate the examination of the impact of distracting
emotional information on cognitive processes operating outside of
the emotional system (Egner, Etkin, Gale, & Hirsch, 2008). Studies
of emotional conﬂict adaptation in GAD suggest that poor abilities
to detect emotional or cognitive conﬂict and subsequently adjust
performance may play a role in clinical anxiety, as clinical levels
of perseverative worry associated with GAD may place additional
demands on cognitive systems in part by taxing attentional control
systems (Etkin & Schatzberg, 2011). Differences in the processing
of emotional information relative to “purely” cognitive information
may elucidate cognitive processes that contribute to pathological
levels of anxiety, including whether it is the cognitive processes
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that are impaired in clinical anxiety, or whether it is the processing
of irrelevant emotional information that interferes with cognitive
processing.
The neural time course of these conﬂict adaptation processes
can be measured using the conﬂict N2 component of the scalprecorded event-related potential (ERP). The conﬂict N2 is a negative
deﬂection in the ERP with a fronto-central scalp distribution
that peaks approximately 250–350 ms after stimulus presentation
(Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Van Den Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof, 2003;
Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). The conﬂict N2 appears to be generated in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and is more negative
on incongruent than congruent trials, suggesting that it may reﬂect
the allocation of top-down cognitive control to reduce conﬂict (van
Veen & Carter, 2002a,b; Yeung et al., 2004). Conﬂict N2 amplitudes
are less negative on incongruent trials preceded by incongruent
trials (iI) relative to incongruent trials following congruent trials
(cI) and on congruent trials following incongruent trials (iC) relative to congruent following congruent trials (cC; Clayson & Larson,
2011a; Clayson & Larson, 2011b). This top-down biasing decreases
levels of conﬂict on the following trial, resulting behaviorally in
faster response times (RTs) and decreased error rates on iI trials
relative to cI trials (e.g., Clayson & Larson, 2011a; Clayson & Larson,
2011b; Forster, Cameron, Cohen, & Cho, 2011; Gratton et al., 1992;
Ullsperger, Bylsma, & Botvinick, 2005). Alternatively, faster RTs and
lower error rates on iI relative to cI trials may be the result of
the facilitative effects of repetition priming (Mayr, Awh, & Laurey,
2003), although this possibility remains controversial and studies
using the precise task employed in the current study show conﬂict
adaptation effects when repetition priming is controlled (Clayson
& Larson, 2011a; Clayson & Larson, 2011b; Forster et al., 2011;
Ullsperger, Bylsma, & Botvinick, 2005). Conversely, RTs and error
rates are increased on iC trials relative to cC trials due to switching
between congruencies (see Egner, 2007, for review). These neural
and behavioral indices of conﬂict adaptation may be sensitive to
subtle differences in cognitive processing, ideal for identifying the
speciﬁc nature of cognitive processing deﬁcits in anxiety disorders.
Research suggests that the neural processes implicated in conﬂict adaptation are altered in GAD. During conﬂict adaptation,
the ACC detects conﬂict and subsequently signals the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) and right ventromedial PFC to increase
cognitive control (Egner, 2011; Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Kerns et al.,
2004). In emotional conﬂict adaptation, activity increases within
the rostral ACC, inhibiting activity within the amygdala in order to
decrease emotional responsiveness to distracting affective stimuli
(Egner, Etkin, Gale, & Hirsch, 2008). In a recent study conducted
by Etkin, Prater, Hoeft, Menon, & Schatzberg (2010), individuals
with GAD displayed decreased activation of the ACC that subsequently did not dampen amygdala response on an emotional
conﬂict task in which emotionally salient words were overlaid on
emotional faces (e.g., the word HAPPY overlaid on a fearful face).
These results may suggest that GAD is associated with an attenuated response to conﬂict resulting in impaired-top down control
and emotional dysregulation (Etkin et al., 2010). Similarly, individuals with panic disorder showed decreased conﬂict adaptation
effects relative to psychiatrically-healthy controls during a similar
emotional conﬂict task, including reduced dorsal ACC recruitment
and increased amygdala activation during trials following incongruent trials (Chechko et al., 2009). Taken together, these ﬁndings
suggest that abnormal patterns of activation observed within the
ACC and amygdala during emotional conﬂict adaptation may be
related to emotional dysregulation associated with anxiety.
Behavioral studies of individuals with clinical levels of anxiety
corroborate neuroimaging ﬁndings by demonstrating decreased
control following conﬂict, highlighting important differences in
top-down regulation. Across multiple studies using an emotional
conﬂict task, individuals with GAD did not display increased RTs
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relative to controls on iI trials relative to cI trials (Etkin et al., 2010;
Etkin & Schatzberg, 2011), evidencing deﬁcits speciﬁc to emotional
conﬂict adaptation. Further, the degree of impairment in emotional
conﬂict adaptation was correlated with levels of anxiety among
patients with GAD, adding support to a relationship between conﬂict processing deﬁcits and symptoms of clinical anxiety (Etkin
et al., 2010). Together, these ﬁndings suggest that pathological anxiety may differentially alter cognitive control mechanisms during
emotional processing, resulting in decreased cognitive ﬂexibility
that may contribute to the pervasive maintenance of worry characteristic of clinical anxiety.
Though it is clear that both neural and behavioral indices of
conﬂict adaptation are altered in anxiety disorders, it is uncertain whether conﬂict processing deﬁcits are primary, secondary,
or independent of deﬁcits in emotional processing. In one behavioral study, adults with obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) and
unipolar depression displayed response repetition slowing during a non-emotional Stroop task, possibly due to increased levels
of rumination in these individuals (Merian, Diamond, Toder, &
Nemets, 2010). These ﬁndings lend support to possible conﬂict
adaptation deﬁcits in the absence of emotional stimuli in anxiety
disorders. However, no studies to date have examined neural and
behavioral indices of conﬂict adaptation in GAD without emotional
stimuli. If differences are present on purely cognitive tasks, it may
be that anxiety disorders are associated with deﬁcits in conﬂict
adaptation independent of emotional processing.
Of note, conﬂict adaptation processes may differ among anxiety disorders and other comorbid conditions. Whereas GAD shares
many characteristics with other anxiety disorders, the nature of
the pervasive worry in GAD may uniquely affect cognitive systems
involved in conﬂict adaptation by reducing the available resources
needed to complete the task (Etkin & Schatzberg, 2011). It may
also be that differences in compensatory processes associated with
anxiety are related to distinct cognitive processes that distinguish
anxiety disorders (Armstrong, Zald, & Olatunji, 2011). While some
similarities in behavioral performance and neural activation have
been observed among anxiety disorders and other comorbid conditions (e.g., depression), distinct patterns of activation and behavior
have also been observed, again pointing to important differences
in cognitive processing and neural activation (Etkin & Schatzberg,
2011). Thus, our primary focus was to determine the nature of
cognitive control processing in individuals with GAD.
Based on the absence of neural and behavioral research in anxiety disorders, we aimed to compare electrophysiological (conﬂict
N2) and behavioral (RTs, error rates) indices of conﬂict adaptation
between individuals with GAD and controls using a non-emotional
modiﬁed ﬂanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). Based on previous research, we predicted that participants with clinical levels
of anxiety would display reduced behavioral modiﬁcation and
electrophysiological activation based on previous trial conﬂict, suggestive of deﬁcits in basic cognitive processing. Speciﬁcally, we
hypothesized that individuals with GAD would display attenuated
N2 amplitudes relative to controls and would not display modulations in N2 amplitude based on previous-trial conﬂict. Similarly, we
predicted that individuals with GAD would not display increased
RTs on iI trials relative to cI trials, again indicating deﬁcits in cognitive control following conﬂict.

2. Method
2.1. Participants
All participants provided written informed consent as approved
by the Brigham Young University Institutional Review Board. Individuals with GAD were recruited via referral from university and
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community mental health centers and were diagnosed prior to participation by a psychiatrist, psychologist, or physician. Diagnoses
were conﬁrmed during participation using the Mini-International
Neuropsychiatric Inventory (MINI; Amorim, Lecrubier, Weiller,
Hergueta, & Sheehan, 1998; Sheehan et al., 1998). The MINI was
chosen because of its concordance with the Structured Clinical
Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID) while requiring less
time to administer (de Azevedo Marques & Zuardi, 2008; Jones et al.,
2005). Control participants were demographically-similar to the
participants with GAD and were recruited from undergraduate psychology courses and the local community. Exclusion criteria for all
participants included current or previous diagnosis of a psychotic
disorder or bipolar disorder, substance use or dependence, neurological disorders, head injury, left-handedness, or uncorrected
visual impairment. Participants using psychoactive medications
did not have any medication changes within the last two months.
Participants either received course credit or ﬁnancial compensation
for their participation.
Study enrollment included 35 individuals with GAD1 (28 female,
7 male) between the ages of 18 and 36 (M = 21.49, SD = 4.30) and
35 psychiatrically healthy control participants (28 female, 7 male)
between the ages of 18 and 29 (M = 21.09, SD = 3.34; see Table 1).
Groups were similar on age, t(68) = −0.44, p = 0.67, and years of
education, t(68) = 0.40, p = 0.69. Twenty-six of 35 (74%) individuals
with GAD were taking one or more psychotropic medications2 at
the time of participation (thus the percentage can be greater than
100%)—primarily selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (20 of 35;
57%), serotonin-norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors (6 of 35; 17%),
benzodiazepines (6 of 35; 17%), and bupropion (3 of 35; 9%). No
controls were taking psychotropic medications.
2.2. Measures
All participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory (2nd
ed.; BDI-II; Beck, 1996) to measure levels of depressive symptoms
and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorusch,
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) to measure levels of state and trait
anxiety. As expected, individuals with GAD endorsed higher levels

1
Of the 35 individuals with GAD, 13 individuals (10 female, 3 male) had
a comorbid diagnosis of major depressive disorder (MDD). When conducting
Group (GAD, GAD with MDD) × Previous-trial Congruency × Current-trial Congruency robust ANOVAs on error rate and N2 TFSF amplitude, the main effects
of group and interactions with group were not signiﬁcant (Ts < 0.3, ps > 0.64).
The robust ANOVA on RTs revealed a signiﬁcant Group × Congruency interaction, TWJt /c(1.0,20.3) = 4.77, p = 0.04. Subsequent decomposition indicated that both
individuals with MDD, TWJt /c(1.0,21.0) = 552.06, p < 0.0001, and individuals with
MDD and GAD, TWJt /c(1.0,12.0) = 125.94, p < 0.0001, showed reliable congruency
effects (i.e., longer RTs to incongruent trials compared to congruent trials). However, group differences were not observed for congruent and incongruent trials
(Ts < 1.4, ps > 0.24). The main effect of group and Group × Previous-trial Congruency × Current-trial Congruency interaction were not signiﬁcant for RTs (Ts < 0.5,
ps > 0.52). Thus, it is unlikely that overall analyses were biased by the inclusion of
individuals with comorbid MDD.
2
To address the possible inﬂuence of medication status on N2 amplitude, separate multiple regression analyses were conducted with mean N2 TFSF and mean N2
conﬂict adaptation effects as dependent variables. Three predictor variables were
dummy coded for four possible groups based on medication status: no medication, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, serotonin-norepinephrine reuptake
inhibitors, and benzodiazepines. Three participants were taking bupropion in conjunction with another medication; however, buproprion was not included as a
separate group as too few participants were taking this medication. Participants
taking medications from more than one of the three possible medication classes
were dummy coded as belonging to multiple groups. Findings from the multiple
regression models with mean N2 TFSF and mean N2 conﬂict adaptation effects
as dependent variables were not statistically signiﬁcant, R2 = 0.01, F(3,31) = 0.12,
p = 0.95; R2 = 0.09, F(3,31) = 1.01, p = 0.41, respectively. There were no signiﬁcant single predictors. These ﬁndings suggest that medication status did not signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence ﬁndings from the overall N2 analyses in individuals with GAD.

of depression, state anxiety, and trait anxiety relative to control
participants (|ts| > 5.8, ps < 0.001; see Table 1).
2.3. Experimental task
Participants completed a modiﬁed version of the Eriksen Flanker
Task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). Each trial consisted of either congruent (««<, »»>) or incongruent («>«, »<») arrow stimuli presented
in white on a black background of a 17-inch computer monitor
approximately 20 inches from the participant’s head. Participants
were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible
with a right-hand key press. An index-ﬁnger button press was used
if the target stimulus (i.e., middle arrow) pointed to the left and a
middle-ﬁnger button press was used if the target stimulus pointed
to the right. No feedback about performance was provided during
the task. Flanker stimuli were presented 100 ms prior to the onset
of the target stimulus, which remained on the screen for 600 ms.
If the participant responded after 1600 ms, the trial was counted
as an error of omission. The ITI varied randomly between 800 ms,
1000 ms, and 1200 ms, with a mean of 1000 ms. Three blocks of
266 trials (798 total trials) were presented, with 354 congruent trials (45%) and 444 incongruent trials (55%). Given that participants
tend to make more errors on incongruent trials than congruent
trials, we included more incongruent trials in an effort to keep
the number of trials similar between conditions. Participants completed 24 practice trials to ensure understanding prior to beginning
the experimental task.
2.4. Electrophysiological data recording and reduction
Electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 128 scalp
sites using a geodesic sensor net and Electrical Geodesics, Inc.
(EGI; Eugene, OR) ampliﬁer system (20 K nominal gain, bandpass = 0.10–100 Hz). During recording, EEG was referenced to the
vertex electrode and digitized continuously at 250 Hz with a 24-bit
analog-to-digital converter. Impedances were maintained below
50 kW. Data were digitally low-pass ﬁltered at 30 Hz.
Individual-subject stimulus-locked averages were calculated
using a window from −250 ms prior to stimulus presentation to
1000 ms following stimuli presentation for cC, cI, iC, and iI trials.
Eye blinks were removed from the segmented waveforms using
independent components analysis (ICA) implemented in the ERP
PCA Toolkit (Dien, 2010). The ICA components that correlated at
.9 with the scalp topography of two blink templates, one generated based on the current data and another provided by the ERP
PCA Toolkit author, were removed from the data (Dien, Michelson,
& Franklin, 2010). Trials were considered bad if more than 15% of
channels were marked bad. Channels were marked bad if the fast
average amplitude exceeded 100 V or if the differential average
amplitude exceeded 50 V. Data were average rereferenced including the polar average reference effect (PARE) correction (Junghöfer,
Elbert, Tucker, & Braun, 1999). Waveforms were baseline corrected
using a 200 ms window from −250 ms to −50 ms prior to stimulus
presentation.
Single-subject average N2 amplitude was ﬁrst analyzed then
individual-subject ERPs were analyzed using a temporospatial
principal components analysis (PCA) to ensure that functionally
equivalent ERP activity were compared between groups. N2 amplitude was ﬁrst extracted using an adaptive mean approach to
avoid biasing effects of background EEG noise (Clayson, Baldwin,
& Larson, 2013). N2 amplitude data were quantiﬁed as the average
ERP activity from 16 ms (four samples) pre-peak to 16 ms post-peak
negative amplitude between 270 ms and 380 ms at channel FCz.
To extract ERP components related to conﬂict monitoring and
conﬂict adaptation, temporospatial PCA was conducted using the
ERP PCA Toolkit (Dien, 2010; Foti, Weinberg, Dien, & Hajcak, 2011).
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Table 1
Demographic and mean response times (ms), error rate, and N2 amplitude (V) summary data as a function of group and trial pairs.
GAD (n = 35)
Mean
Female/male
Age
BDI-II score
STAI-state score
STAI-trait score
cC RT
iC RT
iI RT
cI RT
cC error rates
iC error rates
iI error rates
cI error rates
cC N2 amplitude
iC N2 amplitude
iI N2 amplitude
cI N2 amplitude
cC N2 TFSF amplitude
iC N2 TFSF amplitude
iI N2 TFSF amplitude
cI N2 TFSF amplitude

28/7
21.5
20.6
52.6
57.5
376
401
462
469
4%
4%
10%
16%
0.3
0.5
0.0
−0.3
1.2
1.1
0.6
0.5

Controls (n = 35)
SD

Mean

SD

4.3
9.9
11.3
7.6
39
42
41
45
4%
4%
7%
8%
1.3
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2

28/7
21.1
6.3
35.4
35.7
389
399
462
463
4%
4%
9%
13%
0.3
0.6
−0.4
−1.2
1.7
1.5
−0.1
−0.6

3.3
5.9
13.3
9.1
38
35
38
36
3%
3%
6%
7%
1.9
2.3
2.6
2.7
1.5
1.6
1.8
1.7

GAD = Generalized anxiety disorder.
BDI-II = Beck depression inventory.
STAI = State-trait anxiety inventory.
RT = Response time.
TFSF = Temporospatial factor.
cC = Congruent trial preceded by a congruent trial.
iC = Congruent trial preceded by an incongruent trial.
iI = Incongruent trial preceded by an incongruent trial.
cI = Incongruent trial preceded by a congruent trial.

We followed previously published guidelines to extract ERP components (Dien, Beal, & Berg, 2005; Dien, Khoe, & Mangun, 2007; Foti
et al., 2011). All single subject averages were included in the PCA;
factors were chosen based on scree plots (Catell, 1966) using the
parallel test (Horn, 1965). A temporal PCA with promax rotation
using all time points from single subject averages as variables with
participants, trials, and electrodes as observations was ﬁrst conducted and yielded 16 temporal factors (TFs). A subsequent spatial
PCA with infomax rotation using electrode sites as the variables and
participants, trials, and temporal factors as observations yielded 7
spatial factors (SFs; Dalbert, 1992; Dien et al., 2007).
Similar to previous work using temporospatial PCA to extract
N2 activity (Clawson, Clayson, & Larson, 2013), the TFSF (temporospatial factor) that most closely matched the expected scalp
topography and latency for the N2 was extracted based on visual
inspection of the grand average waveforms, the TFSFs, and prior
research on the N2 (Danielmeier, Wessel, Steinhauser, & Ullsperger,
2009; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003). First, the TFSFs that contributed
less than 1% to the total variance or showed peak activation in the
baseline time window were excluded from further examination
in order to remove TFSFs that were not likely meaningfully contributing to the activity of interest in the current examination (for
a similar approach see Foti et al., 2011; Kujawa, Weinberg, Hajcak, &
Klein, 2013). Of the remaining 22 components, three TFSFs showed
peak activation between 250 ms and 350 ms following stimulus
presentation, the time window frequently used to extract N2 activity (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003; Yeung et al., 2004). Of those three
components only TF5SF2 showed fronto-medial peak activation.
Thus, TF5SF2 best reﬂected the N2 and showed peak activation at
FCz and peak latency at 318 ms (see Larson, Clayson, & Baldwin,
2012b for sensor layout). TF5SF2 showed a similar scalp topography and peak latency compared to other work using temporospatial
PCA to extract the N2 (Clawson et al., 2013) suggesting that TF5SF2
accurately reﬂects N2 activity. Amplitude data was extracted as the
peak-latency instantaneous amplitude of the N2 TFSF.

2.5. Data analysis
In order to overcome the biasing effects of nonnormality, (co)variance heterogeneity between groups, non-orthogonal
groups, and to reduce Type I error (Dien & Santuzzi, 2005), robust
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted using the ERP PCA
Toolkit (Dien, 2010; Keselman, Wilcox, & Lix, 2003). Robust ANOVA
statistics are interpreted in a similar manner as traditional ANOVAs,
but are not susceptible to assumption violations in the same way as
traditional ANOVAs. To decompose signiﬁcant interactions, Fisher’s
least signiﬁcant difference approach was used to control for familywise Type I error. The seed for the number generation was set at
1000, and the number of iterations used for bootstrapping was
50,000 (Clayson & Larson, 2012; Dien, Franklin, & May, 2006; Dien
et al., 2010; Larson, Clawson, Clayson, & South, 2012a). Response
time data were calculated excluding omitted-response trials. For
RTs and ERPs, error trials and post-error trials were also excluded
due to previous research showing faster RTs on error trials and
slower RTs on post-error trials (Clayson & Larson, 2011a; Larson,
Kaufman, & Perlstein, 2009b).
Separate 2-Group (GAD, controls) × 2-Previous-trial Congruency (congruent, incongruent) × 2-Current-trial Congruency (congruent, incongruent) robust ANOVAs were ﬁrst conducted for
RTs, error rates, N2 single-subject average amplitude, and N2
TFSF amplitudes to verify that conﬂict adaptation effects were
present in the data. Conﬂict adaptation was deﬁned as a signiﬁcant
Previous-trial Congruency × Current-trial Congruency interaction
and a signiﬁcant subsequent cI/iI difference on decomposition
(Clayson & Larson, 2012). We did not examine repetition priming
in this study to reduce the possibility of multiple comparisons as
we have previously shown that repetition priming does not signiﬁcantly alter ERP or behavioral conﬂict adaptation using an identical
task (Clayson & Larson, 2011b).
Next, we wanted to examine the dimensional role of trait anxiety symptoms. Thus, in order to examine the relationship between
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Fig. 1. (A) Grand average stimulus-locked scalp-channel N2 at FCz for each previous-trial and current-trial pair as a function of group. (B) Voltage map of the incongruent
minus congruent difference.

N2 conﬂict adaptation effect amplitudes and trait anxiety and
depression levels zero-order correlations were conducted including all participants as well as separately for controls and individuals
with GAD. Mean conﬂict adaptation effects were calculated using
the formula (cI−cC)−(iI−iC) (see Clayson & Larson, 2012). For ease
of interpretation, the inverse of N2 amplitude data was used in
order to make higher mean conﬂict adaptation scores evidence
of improved control implementation similar to RT and error rate
mean conﬂict adaptation scores (i.e., increased N2, RTs and error
rate mean conﬂict adaptation scores evidencing greater implementation of control). The correlations between mean RT and mean
scalp-channel N2 and principal-component N2 conﬂict adaptation
scores were also examined.

cI and iI trials, TWJt /c(1.0,34.0) = 0.22, p = 0.64. These ﬁndings indicate that the Previous-trial Congruency × Current-trial Congruency
interaction was primarily the result of slowing associated with
switching congruencies on an iC trial compared to cC trial rather
than conﬂict adaptation effects for the control participants (see
Clayson & Larson, 2011b).
For individuals with GAD, the Previous-trial Congruency × Current-trial Congruency interaction was signiﬁcant,
TWJt /c(1.0,34.0) = 88.95, p < 0.0001. RTs were longer for cI trials
than for iI trials indicating that RTs showed signiﬁcant conﬂict
adaptation effects, TWJt /c(1.0,34.0) = 13.48, p = 0.002; iC-trial RTs
were also longer than cC-trial RTs, TWJt /c(1.0,34.0) = 137.25,
p < 0.0001. In sum, signiﬁcant RT conﬂict adaptation effects were
observed for individuals with GAD.

3. Results
3.2. Error rates
3.1. Response times
Response time data are presented in Table 1. A Group ×
Previous-trial Congruency × Current-trial Congruency robust
ANOVA on RTs indicated a nonsigniﬁcant main effect of
group, TWJt /c(1.0,66.8) = 0.02, p = 0.90. Incongruent-trial RTs
were longer than congruent trial RTs as indicated by a main
effect of current-trial congruency, TWJt /c(1.0,66.2) = 1,112.09,
p < 0.0001. The Group × Current-trial Congruency interaction was
not signiﬁcant, TWJt /c(1.0,66.2) = 3.48, p = 0.07. The Previous-trial
Congruency × Current-trial Congruency interaction was signiﬁcant, TWJt /c(1.0,65.5) = 85.50, p < 0.0001. Longer RTs were shown for
cI trials compared to iI trials, TWJt /c(1.0,58.6) = 11.07, p = 0.002, and
for iC trials relative to cC trials, TWJt /c(1.0,65.4) = 108.14, p < 0.0001.
Thus, overall RT data showed reliable conﬂict adaptation effects.
Notably, the Group × Previous-trial × Current-trial Congruency
was also signiﬁcant, TWJt /c(1.0,67.6) = 21.35, p < 0.0001.
For controls, the Previous-trial Congruency × Current-trial
Congruency interaction was signiﬁcant, TWJt /c(1.0,34.0) = 11.64,
p = 0.002. RTs were longer for iC trials compared to cC trials,
TWJt /c(1.0,34.0) = 14.84, p < 0.001; however, RTs were similar for

Error rate data are presented in Table 1. A robust ANOVA
on error rates yielded a signiﬁcant main effect of current-trial
congruency with larger error rates for incongruent than for
congruent trials, TWJt /c(1.0,67.5) = 139.37, p < 0.0001. The Previoustrial Congruency × Current-trial Congruency interaction was also
signiﬁcant, TWJt /c(1.0,68.0) = 52.39, p < 0.0001. Error rates were
larger for cI trials than for iI trials suggesting that signiﬁcant
conﬂict adaptation effects were exhibited in error rate data,
TWJt /c(1.0,67.7) = 53.35, p < 0.0001. Error rates were similar for iC
and cC trials, TWJt /c(1.0,67.9) = 2.20, p = 0.14. The main effect of
group and interactions with group were not signiﬁcant (Ts < 3.3,
ps > 0.07). Thus, participants in both groups exhibited similar error
rates regardless of condition.
3.3. N2 amplitude
N2 grand average waveforms and scalp voltage maps are presented in Fig. 1. Summary data for the N2 are presented in Table 1.
Importantly, there were no signiﬁcant group differences observed
between individuals with GAD and controls for background noise
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Fig. 2. (A) Temporal factor 5 spatial factor 2 (TF5SF2) reﬂecting principal component N2 activity at FCz for each group. (B) Voltage map for TF5SF2 difference activity
(incongruent minus congruent).

estimates (see Clayson et al., 2013; Schimmel, 1967) or number of
trials corrected for ocular artifact (Ts < 1.9, ps > 0.17). Single subject averages for controls had an average ± standard deviation of
145 ± 26 cC trials, 146 ± 26 cI trials, 152 ± 25 iC trials, and 163 ± 35
iI trials. Averages for individuals with GAD included 117 ± 34 cC
trials, 125 ± 37 cI trials, 129 ± 38 iC trials, and 145 ± 46 iI trials.
For the scalp-channel N2 amplitude data extracted from the
traditional ERP averages, a main effect of current-trial congruency
was shown such that N2 amplitudes were more negative for incongruent than for congruent trials, TWJt /c(1.0,56.5) = 37.15, p < 0.0001.
The Previous-trial Congruency × Current-trial Congruency interaction was also signiﬁcant indicating that signiﬁcant conﬂict adaptation effects were observed, TWJt /c(1.0,67.9) = 4.54, p = 0.04. Notably,
scalp-channel N2 amplitude was more negative for cI trials than
for iI trials corroborating that signiﬁcant conﬂict adaptation effects
were shown for the scalp-channel N2, TWJt /c(1.0,67.9) = 21.01,
p < 0.0001. N2 amplitudes were more negative for cC trials compared to iC trials, TWJt /c(1.0,67.2) = 4.81, p = 0.03. The
Group × Current-trial Congruency interaction was signiﬁcant,
TWJt /c(1.0,56.5) = 4.13, p = 0.046. Both controls and individuals with
GAD showed more negative scalp-channel N2 amplitude to incongruent trials compared to congruent trials, TWJt /c(1.0,34.0) = 22.74,
p < 0.0001; TWJt /c(1.0,34.0) = 15.07, p < 0.001, respectively. Similar
scalp-channel N2 amplitude was observed between groups for
congruent and incongruent trials, TWJt /c(1.0,59.0) < 0.01, p = 0.95;
TWJt /c(1.0,56.5) = 1.24, p = 0.27, respectively. The Group × Previoustrial Congruency × Current-trial Congruency interaction was not
signiﬁcant, TWJt /c(1.0,67.9) = 2.45, p = 0.12.
The principal-component N2 TFSF waveforms and scalp
voltage maps are presented in Fig. 2. For N2 TFSF amplitude data, principal-component N2 amplitudes were more
negative for incongruent trials than for congruent trials, TWJt /c(1.0,64.3) = 57.32, p < 0.0001. The Previous-trial
Congruency × Current-trial Congruency interaction was signiﬁcant, TWJt /c(1.0,67.9) = 8.26, p = 0.005. Principal-component
N2 amplitudes were more negative for cI trials than for
iI trials indicating that reliable conﬂict adaptation effects

were demonstrated, TWJt /c(1.0,65.1) = 7.64, p = 0.008; cC-trial
principal-component N2 amplitude and iC-trial principalcomponent N2 amplitude were similar, TWJt /c(1.0,66.1) = 1.18,
p = 0.28. The main effect of group was not signiﬁcant,
TWJt /c(1.0,61.5) = 0.50, p = 0.49.
The Group x Current-trial Congruency interaction was signiﬁcant, TWJt /c(1.0,64.3) = 15.45, p < 0.001. Both controls and
individuals with GAD showed more negative principal-component
N2 amplitude for incongruent trials compared to congruent
trials, TWJt /c(1.0,34.0) = 53.30, p < 0.0001; TWJt /c(1.0,34.0) = 8.73,
p = 0.008, respectively. More negative incongruent-trial principalcomponent N2 amplitude was exhibited in controls relative to
individuals with GAD, TWJt /c(1.0,60.3) = 6.22, p = 0.02; group differences were not observed for congruent-trial principal-component
N2 amplitude, TWJt /c(1.0,64.2) = 1.95, p = 0.17.
Most importantly, the Group × Previous-trial Congruency × Current-trial Congruency interaction was also signiﬁcant,
TWJt /c(1.0,67.9) = 5.02, p = 0.03. For controls, the Previoustrial Congruency × Current-trial Congruency interaction was
signiﬁcant, TWJt /c(1.0,34.0) = 13.62, p = 0.001. More negative
principal-component N2 amplitude was exhibited for cI trials
than for iI trials indicating reliable conﬂict adaptation effects,
TWJt /c(1.0,34.0) = 10.57, p = 0.003. Nonsigniﬁcant differences were
observed for iC and cC trials, TWJt /c(1.0,34.0) = 1.37, p = 0.25. The
Previous-trial Congruency × Current-trial Congruency interaction
was not signiﬁcant for individuals with GAD, TWJt /c(1.0,34.0) = 0.19,
p = 0.66.
3.4. Zero-order correlations
To examine the relationship between endorsed anxiety and
depression symptoms and indices of conﬂict adaptation across a
range of symptom severity, we included all participants regardless of diagnosis in correlational analyses. Higher BDI-II, STAI-State,
and STAI-Trait scores were associated with higher mean RT conﬂict adaptation effects, r(68) = 0.32, p = 0.007; r(68) = 0.40, p = 0.001;
r(68) = 0.44, p = 0.0001, respectively (see Fig. 3). Higher STAI-State

414

M.J. Larson et al. / Biological Psychology 94 (2013) 408–418

Fig. 3. Scatterplots of the relationship between mean response time (RT) and error rate conﬂict adaptation effects and depression and anxiety measures. BDI-II = Beck
Depression Inventory; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory.

scores were related to higher mean error rate conﬂict adaptation effects, r(68) = 0.28, p = 0.02 (see Fig. 3). Higher BDI-II and
STAI-Trait scores were related to lower (less negative) mean
principal-component N2 overall conﬂict adaptation effect amplitudes, r(68) = −0.29, p = 0.02; r(68) = −0.28, p = 0.02, respectively
(see Fig. 4). Mean principal-component N2 and mean scalp-channel
N2 conﬂict adaptation effects were inversely related to mean RT
conﬂict adaptation effects, such that higher principal-component
N2 and scalp-channel N2 conﬂict adaptation scores were related to
lower mean RT conﬂict adaptation scores; r(68) = −0.24, p = 0.047;
r(68) = −0.24, p = 0.048, respectively. None of the remaining correlations were signiﬁcant (|rs| < 0.19, ps > 0.12; see Table 2).

When examining the correlations between mean CA effects and
BDI-II, STAI-Trait, and STAI-State scores separately for controls and
individuals with GAD, none of the correlations were signiﬁcant
(|rs| < 0.31, ps > 0.08; see Table 2). Furthermore, the relationship
between mean principal-component N2 and mean scalp-channel
N2 conﬂict adaptation scores and mean RT conﬂict adaptation
scores were not signiﬁcant for either group (|rs| < 0.27, ps > 0.11).
4. Discussion
We capitalized on the temporal resolution of ERPs to show
decreased trial-by-trial conﬂict adaptation neural processes in

Table 2
Zero-order correlations for measures of conﬂict adaptation (CA) and depression and anxiety scores.
Group
All Participants

Controls

GAD

*

p < 0.05.
p < 0.01.
BDI-II = Beck depression inventory.
STAI = State-trait anxiety inventory.
RT = Response time.
TFSF = Temporospatial factor.
GAD = Generalized anxiety disorder.
**

BDI
Mean RT CA effects
Mean error rate CA effects
Mean N2 TFSF CA effects
Mean N2 CA effects
Mean RT CA effects
Mean error rate CA effects
Mean N2 TFSF CA effects
Mean N2 CA effects
Mean RT CA effects
Mean error rate CA effects
Mean N2 TFSF CA effects
Mean N2 CA Effects

STAI state
**

0.32
0.09
−0.29*
−0.12
0.18
0.02
−0.23
−0.18
−0.12
−0.14
−0.12
0.11

**

0.40
0.28**
−0.16
−0.18
0.30
0.26
−0.07
−0.07
0.03
0.11
0.05
−0.13

STAI trait
0.44*
0.17
−0.28**
−0.16
0.21
0.02
−0.24
−0.21
−0.04
−0.05
0.001
0.18
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Fig. 4. Scatterplots of the relationship between mean N2 temporospatial factor
(TFSF) conﬂict adaptation effects and depression and anxiety measures. A separate
regression of ﬁt line is shown for controls, individuals with GAD, and all participants.
BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory.

individuals with GAD relative to demographically similar control participants using stimuli without emotional content or
performance feedback. We observed no signiﬁcant group differences for accuracy and intact RT-related conﬂict adaptation in
individuals with GAD. Electrophysiological data revealed attenuated principal-component N2 amplitudes among individuals with
GAD for incongruent but not congruent trials and no principalcomponent N2 conﬂict adaptation effects for those with GAD;
groups did not differ on scalp-channel N2 waveform amplitudes.
The reduction in the principal-component N2 was most pronounced in individuals with increased anxiety and depressive
symptoms. These ﬁndings can be interpreted in the context of a
reduction in the general detection of conﬂict in those with GAD,
as they showed decreased principal-component N2 amplitudes for
incongruent, but not congruent, trials when collapsed across previous trial congruency. Thus, it appears that the conﬂict adaptation
reductions in those with GAD in comparison to controls are inﬂuenced by inefﬁciencies in conﬂict detection, not just by decreased
adjustments on a trial-by-trial basis.
Ours is the ﬁrst study to use the temporal sensitivity of ERPs
in examining conﬂict adaptation in individuals with GAD, but our
ﬁndings are consistent with one study of the N2 ERP in high
trait anxiety participants and a growing body of research showing
altered GAD-related conﬂict adaptation processes. Dennis and Chen
(2009) showed reduced scalp-channel N2 amplitudes following
threat stimuli in highly anxious participants following threatening, but not other face stimuli presentation. Responses to neutral
face stimuli did not differ between high and low anxiety participants. Etkin et al. (2010) and Etkin and Schatzberg (2011) reported
reduced ACC activity in individuals with GAD relative to controls
on a face-Stroop conﬂict adaptation paradigm leading them to
conclude that those with GAD fail to adapt to emotional conﬂict.
Increased anxiety levels are also associated with decreased conﬂict processing abilities, similar to our ﬁndings (e.g., Etkin et al.,
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2010). The key difference between our study and the previous
work, however, is in the nature of the stimuli. Prior to our study
it was unclear whether GAD-related deﬁcits in conﬂict adaptation
were due to the emotional nature of the tasks used or are primarily the result of poor conﬂict detection and resolution mechanisms
regardless of emotional content. Our results suggest that decreased
conﬂict adaptation in GAD is present in cognitive tasks without
an emotional component. That is, GAD-related deﬁcits in conﬂict
adaptation appear to be independent of emotional processing. Such
deﬁcits are primarily present when the amplitude of the N2 is isolated in a TFSF, rather than in the more traditional scalp-channel
N2, potentially suggesting multiple contributing sources to the N2.
These ﬁndings have implications for studies that suggest pathological compensation to emotional stimuli or emotional processes
as a mechanism for GAD (e.g., Etkin & Schatzberg, 2011). Speciﬁcally, individuals with GAD may poorly compensate for many types
of stimuli of both emotional and non-emotional content indicating
a fundamental deﬁcit in conﬂict processing. This possibility does
not preclude ﬁndings by the Etkin group that decreased ACC activity fails to dampen amygdala response, but rather are consistent
with a wider-spread dysregulation of ACC-related neural processes.
Such ACC deﬁcits may be related to amygdala activity in some,
but not all, instances. Several studies show ACC-related activity in
conﬂict adaptation paradigms (e.g., Kerns et al., 2004; Sheth et al.,
2012). Similarly, recent studies report altered ACC morphology and
activity in those with GAD including altered white matter connectivity in those with GAD compared to controls (Zhang et al., 2013),
positive correlations between ACC volume and GAD-related worry
(Schienle, Ebner, & Schafer, 2010), and longer ACC-related activity in mood induction paradigms that emphasize worry relative to
other non-anxious conditions (Paulesu et al., 2010). Indeed, one
study suggested that uncertainty as to response accuracy may be
a key component in GAD-related developmental processes (Krain
et al., 2006) and another showed that the magnitude of pretreatment ACC activity predicted subsequent treatment response to
venlafaxine even though overall ACC activity was not fully differentiated from controls (Whalen et al., 2008). Taken together, the
alterations in ACC functioning relative to controls appears to be a
contributor to GAD-related pathology.
The precise nature and mechanism of altered conﬂict processing
and ACC activity in individuals with GAD and high levels of anxiety, however, remains somewhat unclear. For example, a study
that examined individuals with high trait levels of anxiety (but not
diagnosed GAD) and a non-emotional face-Stroop task (i.e., a gender discrimination task) showed increased, rather than decreased,
ERP indices of ACC-mediated conﬂict adaptation associated with
high trait anxiety (Osinsky, Alexander, Gebhardt, & Hennig, 2010).
A follow-up study that used a similar gender discrimination task
with three separate conditions – word only, face only, and faceword overlay – showed faster conﬂict adaptation RTs in individuals
with high trait anxiety for face only stimuli, but not face-word overlay and word only stimuli (Osinsky, Gebhardt, Alexander, & Hennig,
2012). For ERPs, there were no signiﬁcant correlations between
conﬂict-related ERPs and trait anxiety symptoms in the face-word
overly condition, but there were signiﬁcant negative correlations
between anxiety symptoms and face and word-processing ERPs in
the face and word only conditions. There were, however, differences between overlaid face-word stimuli and the more cognitive
face and word alone stimuli, supporting the premise of the current
study to examine conﬂict adaptation processes without emotional content. We note that these studies were done in healthy
individuals with high trait anxiety and used face-word stimuli.
Taken together, there appears to be some variability in ﬁndings
across studies of conﬂict adaptation in high anxiety. Whereas our
study adds to previous research supporting altered conﬂict related
processing associated with clinical levels of anxiety, it is unclear
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how high levels of trait anxiety inﬂuence the processing of conﬂict.
Three studies show increased amplitude of the error-related
negativity (ERN) component of the ERP in those with GAD
compared to control and GAD plus comorbid MDD participants
(Weinberg, Olvet, & Hajcak, 2010; Weinberg, Klein, & Hajcak, 2012;
Xiao et al., 2011). The ERN is a fronto-central response-locked ERP
that is thought to reﬂect ACC-related conﬂict activity between error
and correct trials just after an erroneous response (Danielmeier
et al., 2009; Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Banke, 1991;
Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993; Nieuwenhuis,
Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok, 2001; Yeung et al., 2004); whereas
the N2 is thought to represent the detection of stimulus-related
conﬂict between the ﬂanker and target stimuli (Folstein & Van
Petten, 2008; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003; Yeung et al., 2004; Yeung &
Cohen, 2006). Both the N2 and ERN are source localized to the ACC
(Brazdil, Roman, Daniel, & Rektor, 2005; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger,
Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004; van Veen & Carter, 2002a; Yeung et al.,
2004), are thought by some to reﬂect the same conﬂict related processes, with the ERN reﬂecting the conﬂict between correct and
error responses and the N2 reﬂecting the conﬂict between target
and ﬂanker processing (Yeung et al., 2004), and show an inverse
relationship with each other based on the amount of previous trial
conﬂict (Larson et al., 2012b).
Our current results indicate decreased-amplitude conﬂictrelated principal-component N2 in GAD, which seems counterintuitive considering ﬁndings of enhanced ERN amplitude in GAD
(Weinberg et al., 2010, 2012; Xiao et al., 2011). Previous research
has evidenced a functional dissociation between the ERN and
N2. For example, previous ﬁndings indicated reduced ERN and
enhanced N2 in a participant with a left-ACC lesion (Swick & Turken,
2002), reduced ERN and normal N2 after alcohol consumption
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2002), reduced ERN and enhanced N2 with
increased proximity of ﬂankers to the target stimulus (Danielmeier
et al., 2009), and increased ERN and normal N2 during a ﬂanker
trial with a bright target stimulus relative to dim target stimulus
(Yeung, Ralph, & Nieuwenhuis, 2007). Indeed, other research on
conﬂict processing has shown normal stimulus-locked ERP amplitude, indexed by the Stroop N450, between controls and individuals
with mild (Larson, Farrer, & Clayson, 2011) and severe traumatic
brain injury (TBI; Larson et al., 2009b), despite research showing
an attenuated ERN in mild (Pontifex, O’Connor, Broglio, & Hillman,
2009) and severe TBI (Larson, Kaufman, & Perlstein, 2009a). Thus,
considering that the N2 putatively indexes selective attention as
it requires the biasing of attention away from the ﬂankers and
the ERN is contingent upon the conﬂict generated by continued
stimulus processing following an erroneous response, GAD may
be associated with impaired selective attention processes requiring the ability to ﬁlter out distracting information and enhanced
target-stimulus processing following erroneous responses.
The RT and error rate data show generally intact reﬂections of
conﬂict adaptation in those with GAD, despite differences in the
principal-component N2 relative to controls. There were no signiﬁcant between-groups differences in error rates as a function of
current or previous trial congruency and RTs showed intact conﬂict adaptation in anxiety and slowed task switching in controls.
These ﬁndings differ from those of Etkin et al. (2010) who observed
increased RTs on iI trials compared to cI trial in controls but not
individuals with GAD. The follow-up study by Etkin and Schatzberg
(2011) showed a lack of RT-related conﬂict adaptation in both
the GAD only and comorbid groups relative to the MDD only and
control groups, suggesting that GAD, regardless of comorbidity is
associated with a reduction in RT-related conﬂict adaptation. All
of these studies have shown different neural correlates of conﬂict
adaptation between GAD and control participants. Other studies
suggest that negative emotion regardless of pathology may reduce

behavioral manifestations of conﬂict adaptation (Padmala, Bauer,
& Pessoa, 2011), but these results are not consistent across studies
(van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2010).
The disconnect between neurologic correlates of conﬂict adaptation and behavioral performance in several of these studies
parallels the current ﬁndings. Etkin and Schatzberg (2011) suggest that intact behavioral performance can be seen in individuals
with pathology despite abnormalities in neurologic circuitry primarily due to compensatory processes that are engaged at the
expense of traditional conﬂict-adaptation pathways. Thus, ACC and
dlPFC-mediated conﬂict adaptation may be supported by other,
unmeasured, areas that serve to hinder the presentation of the N2
in those with GAD. For example, a recent study in individuals with
social anxiety showed increased insula activity to emotional content, but decreased connectivity with the ACC potentially leading to
decreased ACC-related activity (Klumpp, Angstadt, & Phan, 2012).
The hypothesis of compensatory processes inﬂuencing conﬂict
adaptation needs future testing by examining conﬂict adaptation
in an fMRI-type scanning session without the confound of emotional stimuli that is present in the research to date. The ﬁnding that
the principal-component N2 showed differences, but more traditional scalp-channel N2 amplitude did not supports this possibility.
That is, when isolated using PCA, the N2 was smaller in those with
GAD, but when multiple contributors were possible there were no
differences between the GAD and control groups.
5. Limitations
The current results should be considered within the context of
several strengths and limitations. The study sample consisted of
individuals diagnosed with GAD both in the community and conﬁrmed by a structured clinical interview and well-matched control
participants similar in age and education and identical in sex distribution. However, given the community-based nature of the sample
the majority of the GAD participants were taking psychotropic
medications. Thus, it is possible that medications played a role in
the current ﬁndings, though analyses suggest that comorbidity did
not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence our results. Similarly, a small percentage of the GAD participants had a comorbid depressive disorder,
although comorbidity did not appear to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the
current ﬁndings. We also cannot fully rule out the inﬂuence of feature integration effects on the conﬂict adaptation ﬁndings given
that on the ﬂanker task utilized there were was no way to achieve
complete alternations between trials; however, previous research
using an identical ﬂanker task showed behavioral and ERP conﬂict adaptation robust against removal of repetition trials (Clayson
& Larson, 2011b). There is the possibility that the timing of the
RTs inﬂuenced group differences in the N2; however, we ﬁnd this
unlikely as we excluded all error and post-error trials and previous research shows correct-trial response-locked ERPs do not differ
between individuals with GAD and controls (Weinberg et al., 2010,
2012; Xiao et al., 2011). In addition, the control participants did not
show signiﬁcant RT-related conﬂict adaptation, despite intact electrophysiological indicators of conﬂict adaptation. Finally, we were
not able to disentangle the relative contributions of dimensional
depressive and anxiety symptoms in the current study design given
the multicollinearity of our depression and anxiety inventories. A
study speciﬁcally examining depression and anxiety comorbidity is
needed to further understand the relative contributions of depressive and anxious symptoms.
6. Summary and conclusion
In summary, our ﬁndings indicated that electrophysiological indicators of conﬂict adaptation, speciﬁcally the
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principal-component N2, are diminished in individuals with
GAD relative to demographically similar control participants in a
purely cognitive task with no emotional stimuli. More traditional
scalp-channel N2 amplitude and behavioral indices did not differ
between groups. Results suggest that it is likely that poor adjustments to conﬂict in GAD are not solely due to poor regulation of
emotion-related neural processes likely involving the amygdala,
but are more far reaching and involve poor conﬂict detection and
conﬂict adaptation as well as contributions from multiple sources.
Future research is necessary to disentangle whether previous ﬁndings of impaired emotional conﬂict adaptation effects (Etkin et al.,
2010; Etkin & Schatzberg, 2011) represent generalized cognitive
control dysfunction or a contribution of impaired cognitive and
emotional conﬂict monitoring processes as well as the possibility
of compensatory systems inﬂuencing cognitive control functions
in those with GAD.
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